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Abstract
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1 Introduction
It is well accepted that monetary policy plays an essential role in providing a stable macroe-
conomic background which facilitates the efficient allocation of resources. To demonstrate that
such an economic environment can be achieved by adopting an optimal monetary policy frame-
work, researchers have proposed several alternative models leading to the development of a vast
literature. For instance, a large number of studies advocate the adoption of inflation targeting
and its implementation through variants of Taylor rule.1 Yet many (recent) studies including
McCallum and Nelson (2000), Clarida et al. (2001), Taylor (2001), Clarida et al. (2002), Batini
et al. (2003), Dennis (2003), Leitemo and So¨derstro¨m (2005), and D’Adamo (2011) argue that
the impact of foreign factors on the domestic policy is small, and therefore their effects can be
excluded.2
However, in an open economy context, it is somewhat surprising to discount the role of
exchange rate movements on the monetary transmission mechanism: exchange rates which
respond to foreign disturbances do affect domestic prices. To that end, Ball (1999b) shows
that although Taylor rules are optimal in a closed economy context these policies perform
poorly in an open economy framework unless they are modified to account for the movements
in the exchange rates. Svensson (2000) argues that the optimal reaction function in an open
economy accounts for more information in comparison to a closed economy Taylor rule. He
discusses the presence of various direct and indirect channels through which the exchange rate
can affect monetary policy and shows that CPI-inflation responds to foreign variables including
foreign inflation, foreign interest rate, exchange rate and shocks from the rest of the world.
More recently Gali and Monacelli (2005), Lubik and Schorfheide (2007), and Adolfson et al.
(2008) implement open economy DSGE models to investigate whether central banks respond to
exchange rate movements. In this framework, Chen and MacDonald (2012) move a step further
by incorporating parameter instability into a small scale open economy DSGE model.
It is also important to note that the recent literature in monetary economics has challenged
1Researchers have examined different variants of the Taylor rule by introducing backward or forward looking
components while allowing the policy makers to have linear or nonlinear objective functions. Among others
see for instance Taylor (1993), Svensson (1997), Ball (1999a), Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), Ireland (1999),
Clarida et al. (2000), Ruge-Murcia (2003b), Dolado et al. (2004), and Surico (2007).
2For instance Taylor (2001) argue that the exchange rate changes are implicitly incorporated through prices
therefore the closed economy models are well representative of an open economy scenario. Similarly, Clarida
et al. (2001) document that the open economy models are isomorphic to the closed economy models.
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the assumption that policy makers minimize a quadratic loss function subject to a linear IS
equation and a Philips curve —the assumption that the vast majority of research on optimal
policy rules has used. Cukierman and Gerlach (2003) suggest that a central bank responds
strongly to inflation when the economy is in expansion and to output gap when the economy is
in contraction. Dolado et al. (2005) relax the assumption of a linear Phillips curve while allowing
both inflation and the loss function to be convex functions of the output gap. In particular,
Nobay and Peel (1998), Ruge-Murcia (2000), Ruge-Murcia (2003a), Dolado et al. (2004), Surico
(2007) and Surico (2003) assume that central banks have a linear exponential (i.e. linex) loss
function. The use of this function allows the monetary policy authorities to have an asymmetric
response towards inflation and/or output gap as actual inflation or output level exceeds or falls
short of the target. In this approach since the quadratic loss function corresponds to a special
case where the asymmetry parameter of the linex loss function is equal to zero, one can test the
null hypothesis of quadratic preferences against the alternative of asymmetric preferences.
In this paper, different from the existing literature, we model the optimal monetary policy
rule of a central bank in an open economy framework while we allow for asymmetric prefer-
ences such that the policy makers can weigh positive and negative deviations of inflation and
output gap from their corresponding targets differently. To achieve our purpose, we use an
open economy New-Keynesian model where aggregate demand and supply depend on the real
exchange rate while we assume that policy makers have a linex loss function. The latter as-
sumption implies that the certainty equivalence does not hold and uncertainty will induce a
prudent behavior on the part of the central bank. Thus, in this set up, minimization of the
loss function subject to the IS equation and the Philips curve lead to an optimal reaction func-
tion which respond not only to the deviation of inflation and output gap from their respective
targets but also to changes in the exchange rate and to the volatility of inflation and output
gap. Therefore, within this framework while we discuss the effect of changes in exchange rate
and foreign monetary policy on the domestic interest rate, we can also examine whether policy
makers have asymmetric response towards inflation and/or output gap across different phases
of the business cycles.
We estimate the resulting optimal policy rule from our model using quarterly data for four
major industrialized countries including Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom (UK) and the
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United States (US). Our dataset spans the period over 1979q1-2010q1, while for each country the
starting point of the empirical analysis depends on the specific factors that affected the behavior
of each central bank to implement independent monetary policy. Our empirical findings, based
on the generalized method of moments approach, provide evidence that central banks follow an
active monetary policy and control for the impact of real exchange rate on output and inflation.
We show that policy makers in all four countries have asymmetric preferences with respect to
both inflation and output gap such that they weigh positive and negative deviations of inflation
and output gap differently. We also find that the domestic interest rate reacts positively with
respect to changes in foreign interest rate.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
discusses the empirical issues and the data. Section 4 lays out the empirical results while
Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
In this section we present a New-Keynesian model for an open economy whose variants are
implemented in, among others, Ball (1999b), Svensson (2000), Clarida et al. (2001) and Leitemo
et al. (2002). The economic structure we present below differs from that of Ball (1999b) as our
model contains forward looking elements. The structure we present here is also different from
that of Leitemo et al. (2002) as the forward looking element in their model is embedded only
in the behavior of the exchange rate which is determined by the uncovered interest parity
(UIP) condition. Furthermore, different from both studies we allow the policy makers to have
asymmetric response towards inflation and output gap as their actual levels exceeds or falls
short of the corresponding targets. We obtain the policy rule for our proposed framework by
solving an intertemporal optimization problem.
2.1 Economic Structure
The dynamics of the open economy are given by the following three equations which describe
the behavior of the output gap, inflation and the exchange rate, respectively.
4
yt = α1Etyt+1 − α2(it − Etpit+1) + α3qt + εyt+1 (1)
pit = β1Etpit+1 + β2yt + β3(Etqt+1 − qt) + εpit+1 (2)
qt = Etqt+1 − (it − Epit+1) + (ift − Epift+1) (3)
Equation (1) is an open economy forward looking aggregate demand curve (IS-curve). At any
point in time t, the output gap is denoted by yt, the domestic nominal interest rate is it and
inflation is pit. Expected value of variable xt+1 given the information set at time t is denoted
by Etxt+1. This equation implies that the expected course of real interest rate has a negative
impact on the output gap. Equation (1) also assumes that the real exchange rate, qt, which is
defined as the domestic currency price of foreign currency, has a positive effect on the output
gap. yt depicts demand shocks.
Equation (2) describes an open-economy Phillips curve. This equation allows the price set-
ters to adjust the current prices accounting for future marginal costs. In that sense this equation
captures the Calvo-type world in which the price adjustment takes place with a constant prob-
ability by each firm in a given period of time. Here, inflation is a positive function of the output
gap. We also assume that the real exchange rate affects inflation positively as suggested by
Svensson (2000) who argues that the current exchange rate has a direct impact on the CPI
inflation rate.3,4 In this equation pit captures cost disturbances.
Equation (3) suggests that the real exchange rate is determined according to the UIP con-
ditions. The foreign interest rate and the foreign expected inflation rate are denoted by ift and
pift+1, respectively. Hence, the first and the second parenthesized terms capture the domestic
and the foreign real interest rates at time t. Equation (3) shows that an increase in the domestic
real interest rate leads to an appreciation of the exchange rate as the domestic assets become
more attractive. This equation also shows that an increase in the foreign real interest rate will
result in depreciation of the exchange rate (due to capital flight from the home country).
3Several other researchers, including Ball (1999b) and Leitemo et al. (2002), relate inflation to changes in real
exchange rate. Ball (1999b) argues that changes in the real exchange rate affects the inflation rate by the import
price pass through mechanism which constitute an indirect impact of exchange rate on domestic inflation.
4Introducing difference of the expected exchange rates in Equation (2) rather than the level of exchange rate
does not change our results.
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2.2 Objective Function
Following the earlier research, we assume that the policy makers choose interest rate at the
beginning of time t based upon the information available at the end of the previous period
before the economic shocks are realized. The policy authorities therefore minimize the following
intertemporal loss function:
Min Et−1
∞∑
τ=0
δτLt+τ (4)
subject to the dynamics described in Equations (1-3). In Equation (4), δ is the discount factor
and Lt stands for the period t loss function of the central bank. The objective of the central bank
is to choose a path for its instrument, the short term interest rate, to minimize the expected
loss.
Here, we use a linear exponential (linex) loss function that allows policy makers to weigh
positive and negative deviation of output gap and inflation from their respective targets dif-
ferently. The linex loss function was proposed by Varian (1974). Subsequently, Zellner (1986),
Granger et al. (1996) and Christoffersen and Diebold (1998) used this function in the context of
optimal forecasting. Nobay and Peel (2003) use the linex loss function to study optimal policy
reaction function under both discretion and commitment.5 The loss function that we implement
for our purposes takes the following form:
L(pit, yt) =
eµ(pit−pi∗) − µ(pit − pi∗)− 1
µ2
+ λ
eγyt − γyt − 1
γ2
where the parameters µ and γ capture any asymmetry in the objective function with respect
to inflation and output gap respectively. The policy preference towards inflation stabilization
is normalized to one and λ represents the relative aversion of the policy maker towards output
fluctuations around its long run level. The inflation target set by the central banker is denoted
by pi∗. The output gap target is set to zero.
The significance of µ and γ identifies whether the policy makers have asymmetric response
towards inflation and output gap, respectively, in different economic situations. For instance,
a positive value for µ implies that the central bank is more worried about inflation exceeding
the set target level pi∗ because the cost of high inflation exceeds that of low inflation. This is
5Following Nobay and Peel (2003) several researchers used linex form including Ruge-Murcia (2000), Ruge-
Murcia (2003a) and Surico (2003) among others.
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so because if µ > 0 then the exponential term (eµ(pit−pi∗)) will rule over the linear component.
Thus, positive deviations from the inflation target will have dominant effects on policy makers’
loss function than negative deviations. The reverse is true if µ < 0. In a similar vein, we can
argue that should the central bank place more weight to output contractions (y < 0), then
γ must take a negative value such that the exponential in the second term (eγyt) plays the
dominant role. However if the policy maker is more worried that the economy overshooting its
long run growth (y > 0), then we should observe a positive value for γ. Hence, this framework
can provide us information whether the business cycle fluctuations have welfare effects beyond
the first order or not.
Besides the idea that the policymakers can have asymmetric weights depending on the stance
of inflation and output gap with respect to their targets, the linex function also allows discre-
tion on the part of the central bank so that higher moments of inflation and output gap might
play an important role in designing optimal policy rules (see Kim et al. (2005)). Furthermore,
the evidence of asymmetry implies that certainty equivalence does not hold. Thus, uncertainty
about inflation and output gap will induce a prudent behavior on the part of the central bank.
This is so because uncertainty raises the expected marginal cost of inflation and output gap
from their respective targets. Finally, the model nests the quadratic preferences as a special
case. The loss function reduces to symmetric parametrization when both µ and γ are equal to
zero, which can be empirically tested.
2.2.1 Solution of the model
To solve the model, we first substitute Equation (3) into (1) and (2). After rearranging the
terms, we obtain:
yt = α1Etyt+1 − (α2 + α3)(it − Etpit+1)+α3Etqt+1 + α3(ift − Etpift+1) + εyt+1 (5)
pit = β1Etpit+1 + α1β2yt+1 − [β2(α2 + α3)− β3](it − Etpit+1) + (6)
+(β2α3 − β3)(ift − Etpift+1)+β2α3Etqt+1 + β2εyt + εpit
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Next, we minimize Equation (4) subject to (5) and (6) with respect to the current interest rate
it and obtain the following first order condition:
Et−1
∂L(pit, yt)
∂it
=
−(β2α2 + β2α3 − β3)
µ
Et−1[eµ(pit−pi
∗) − 1]−
λ(α2 + α3)
γ
Et−1[eγyt − 1] = 0 (7)
We assume that the demand and supply shocks (εyt and ε
pi
t ) are normally distributed. Hence,
the exponential terms in Equation (7) are log normally distributed with conditional means
e[µ(pit|t−1−pi
∗+µ
2
σ2pi,t)] and e(
γ2
2
σ2y,t), respectively.6 Here, σ2pi,t and σ
2
y,t denotes the conditional vari-
ance of inflation and output gap, respectively. Thus, we can rewrite Equation (7) in the following
form:
Et−1
∂L(pit, yt)
∂it
=
−(β2α2 + β2α3 − β3)
µ
[e(µ(pit|t−1−pi
∗)+(µ
2
2
)σ2pi,t) − 1]−
λ
γ
(α2 + α3)[e
( γ
2
2
σ2y,t) − 1] = 0 (8)
Linearizing the expression in Equation (8) by taking a first-order Taylor approximation and
solving for expected inflation we arrive at:
Et−1pit = pi∗−µ
2
σ2pi,t −
λ(α2 + α3)
(β2α2 + β2α3 − β3) [(
γ
2
)σ2y,t] (9)
Taking the conditional expectation of Equation (6) with respect to information set available
at time t − 1 and substituting Et−1pit into (9), we can show that the policy variable takes the
following form:
it = ϕ0 + ϕ1Et−1yt+1 + ϕ2Et−1pit+1 + ϕ3Et−1qt+1 (10)
+ ϕ4Et−1(i
f
t − pift+1) + ϕ5σ2pi,t − ϕ6σ2y,t + (error)
Equation (10) depicts the forward looking policy rule of the central bank with asymmetric
preferences in an open economy framework. The associated coefficients of the equation are the
reduced form parameters (ϕi) which measure the response of monetary policy with respect to
6Recall that output gap is a zero mean normally distributed variable so that we have Et−1 exp(γyt) is equal
to e
γ2
2
σ2y,t .
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those variables in the policy rule. In particular, given the parameters in Equations (1-4), each
coefficient (ϕi) in Equation (10), can be written as follows:
ϕ0 =
−pi∗
(α2β2 + α3β2 − β3) , ϕ1 =
α1β2
(α2β2 + α3β2 − β3) , ϕ2 =
β1 + α2β2 + α3β2 + β3
(α2β2 + α3β2 − β3)
ϕ3 =
α3β2
(α2β2 + α3β2 − β3) , ϕ4 =
α3β2 + β3
α2β2 + α3β2 − β3 , ϕ5 =
−µ/2
α2β2 + α3β2 − β3
ϕ6 =
λ(α2 + α3)(γ/2)
(α2β2 + α3β2 − β3)2 .
The policy rule given in Equation (10) by construction differs from the standard Taylor rule
on three facets. First, it incorporates the forward looking expressions of output gap and inflation
rate. Second, it introduces exogenous variables such as the exchange rate and foreign interest
rate. Third, it captures asymmetric preferences by accounting for the volatility of output gap
and inflation rate.
3 Empirical Issues
The policy rule in Equation (10) contains expected future output gap, inflation, the exchange
rate and the foreign real interest rate. We proxy for the expected exchange rate by using twelve-
month ahead forward exchange rates. To compute the expected output gap and inflation rate we
first construct an autoregressive model based upon the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and
Bayesian Information criterion (BIC). The selected model is then used recursively to compute
the h-step ahead out-of-sample forecasts for both series.7 The foreign real interest rate is
calculated as the deviation of nominal interest rate from the expected inflation rate of the
corresponding country.
We estimate Equation (10) implementing the generalized method of moments (GMM) tech-
nique as we replace the unobserved expectations with their forecasts and the volatility terms
with proxies derived from GARCH models as described below. In doing so we face two major
issues concerning the instruments employed in the GMM estimation. First, the reliability of
our econometric methodology depends crucially on the validity of the instruments which we
7We compute the h-step ahead forecast for yt implementing ŷt+h|t = φ̂0 +
∑p
i=1 φ̂iŷt+h−i|t where φ̂i are the
estimated coefficients based on in-sample information. Then φ̂i are used to forecast out-of-sample yt+h.
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evaluate by computing the the Sargan–Hansen J test of overidentifying restrictions, asymptot-
ically distributed as χ2 in the number of restrictions. A rejection of the null hypothesis that
instruments are orthogonal to errors would indicate that the estimates are not consistent. We
also test for the presence of first and second order serial correlation so as to determine the cor-
rect lag structure of the instrument set. In each of the models presented below, the Hansen J
statistic for overidentifying restrictions and the autocorrelation tests show that our instruments
are appropriate and our models do not suffer from serial correlation problem, respectively.
Another important issue in implementing the GMM methodology is the possibility that the
instruments could be weak; that the instruments could be weakly correlated with the endoge-
nous variables. Weak instruments will distort the distribution of the estimators and the test
statistics will lead to misleading statistical inference.8 Therefore, for the reliability of the instru-
mental variable approach, the instruments should be relevant and strongly correlated with the
endogenous variables. Indeed, a measure of the strength of the instruments can be determined
by the concentration parameter (see Anderson (1977)).9 We can test for weak instruments
either by testing for rank deficiency of the concentration statistic or using the reduced rank
regression technique developed by Anderson and Rubin (1950) which is later extended for the
presence of autocorrelated errors by Cragg and Donald (1997), Robin and Smith (2000), and
Kleibergen and Paap (2006). Here, we follow the latter approach and report the p-values of the
reduced rank test suggested in Kleibergen and Paap (2006).
In view of the fact that our model employs expected variables which are generated by the
use of autoregressive models, one may be concerned about the use of lags of these series as
instruments in estimation. We address these concerns by investigating the forecast performance
of the models that we employed. If the models perform well, lags of the series can be used as
proper instruments in our investigation. We test for forecast rationality checking whether the
forecast minimize the loss function of the decision maker. It should be noted that forecast ra-
tionality must be evaluated in consideration of the decision maker’s loss function. If a forecaster
has a quadratic loss function (QLF) then forecast rationality requires forecast to be unbiased
implying that the forecast errors are not on average significantly different from zero. We test
8For a review of weak instruments see Stock et al. (2002). For the impact of weak instruments on statistical
inference see Mavroeidis (2004) and Hansen et al. (1996).
9Intuitively, it is possible to interpret the concentration statistic as a portmanteau F-test on the significance
of instruments which are regressed on an endogenous variable.
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for forecast being unbiased by regressing the forecast error on a constant.10
To further investigate forecast rationality, we next relax the assumption that the forecasters
have a QLF and employ another forecast evaluation test which is optimal for any loss function.
We do so by using the density forecast criterion introduced by Diebold et al. (1998). The
density forecast criterion allows us to test whether the forecasting model used by the researcher
is not significantly different from the model that generated the actual data. If this is the
case then obviously the forecasting model will be optimal for any loss function. Diebold et al.
(1998) show that if a sequence of density forecasts are correctly conditionally calibrated then
the sequence of the probability integral transform of standardized forecast errors are iid and
U(0,1). Berkowitz (2001) suggests an alternative goodness-of-fit test where under the null, the
sequence of standardized forecast errors is iid N(0, 1).11 However, he also argues that to test
for normality more powerful tools can be employed than testing uniformity.12 Under the null
the likelihood ratio test suggested in Berkowitz (2001) follows a χ23. We use both tests but for
the sake of brevity we present results only from the Berkowitz’s test.
Figure 1 here
Figure 2 here
Figure 1 presents visual evidence that in all cases forecasts are unbiased. Thus, the naive
autoregressive models that we use for the out-of-sample forecasting exercise do not system-
atically under-predict or over-predict the target variables. In Figure 2, we present recursive
estimates of density forecasts which implement the naive autoregressive model for all the coun-
tries. However, Figure 2 shows that the naive autoregressive models does not represent the
true data generating process (DGP) for the UK and Japan as the density forecast criterion fails
either the distributional or independence assumption. Although such evidence may raise doubts
10An h-step ahead forecast is autocorrelated of order h-1. We account for autocorrelation by using the het-
eroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent variance covariance matrix suggested by Newey and West (1987).
In our investigation, we adopt uniform weights.
11The density forecast is constructed as follows. We assume that disturbances are i.i.d. Gaussian and compute
the stantardized forecast errors as {z∗t+1} = {( yt+1−ŷt+1σ̂t+1 )} where ŷt+1 is the one-step-ahead forecast of yt+1 made
at time t and σ̂t+1 is the standard deviation of ŷt+1. Then the probability integral transform values are given
by {zt+1} = {Φ(z∗t+1)} where Φ is the Normal CDF. Here, instead of testing for uniformity and independence
of {zt+1} we follow Clements and Smith (2000) and test for normality and independence of {z∗t+1}.We do so by
employing the Doornik and Hansen (1994) normality test and the Ljung-Box for autocorrelation test.
12The Berkowitz test is computed as z∗t = c + ρz
∗
t−1 + εt, LRB = −2[L(0, 1, 0) − L(ĉ, σ̂2, ρˆ)] where L(ĉ, σ̂2, ρˆ)
is the value of the exact maximum likelihood function of an AR(1) model.
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concerning the use of lags of inflation as an instrument, Kleibergen and Paap (2006) show that
lags of these variables are not subject to the problem of weak identification.
The last issue that needs to be addressed is the volatility terms that appear in Equation
(10). To generate these two series (inflation volatility and output gap volatility), we implement
a GARCH(1,1) model. As Pagan (1984) and Pagan and Ullah (1988) point out, the use of gen-
erated regressors may lead to some problems in estimation and statistical inference. According
to Pagan (1984) although one may overcome these problems by using instrumental variables
approach, the use of lagged series as instruments may not be possible when the variable under
consideration is a function of the entire history of the available data. In such cases, Pagan and
Ullah (1988) suggest testing the validity of the underlying assumptions of the model that gen-
erates the proxy. For instance, Ruge-Murcia (2003) follows these suggestions and uses lagged
conditional volatility of unemployment obtained from a GARCH(1,1) model as an own instru-
ment after checking for any remaining heteroscedasticity in the standardized squared residual.
Here, we, too, follow a similar route. We generate output gap and inflation volatility measures
implementing GARCH(p,q) and ARCH(p) models after we carefully check whether these mod-
els are well specified and whether there is any neglected heteroscedasticity. We then use the
lags of these proxies as instruments to estimate our model.
3.1 Data Sources and Definition of Variables
In our empirical investigation we use quarterly data which cover the period between 1979q1-
2010q1. We estimate the policy rule given in Equation (10) for Canada, Japan, the UK and the
US where the starting point of the empirical analysis slightly differs for each country depending
on the specific factors that have affected the behavior of each central bank. To that end we start
the analysis for the UK on 1979q1 as the bank of England increased its emphasis on controlling
inflation. In the case of Japan we begin the analysis as of 1979q1, too, as she went through a
period of financial market deregulation in 1979 where all capital controls were removed and the
Bank of Japan began to use the interbank lending rate to conduct monetary policy.13 In the case
of Canada our starting date is 1980q1 as the bank of Canada began to float the bank rate. Last,
for the US, our investigation begins as of 1983q4. In fact a large body of literature is devoted to
empirically evaluating the monetary policy of the FED by classifying FED’s policy preferences
13See Batten (1990).
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for pre and post 1979 to capture the role of Volcker period. However, Surico (2007) and Ilbas
(2008) argue that the period between 1979–1983 is a period of frequent shifts in the monetary
policy and high uncertainty, and suggest to use the post 1983 period for analysis. Bernanke and
Mihov (1998) also document that during the period 1979q4 -1982q3 the operating procedure
of Fed switched from federal funds rate to non-borrowed reserves targeting. Similarly, Dolado
et al. (2004) conclude that post-1983 period portrays the US policy preferences well. Therefore,
we use the data between 1983q4 and 2010q1 to examine the behavior of the FED’s monetary
policy.
The end date of our empirical analysis of each country is twelve months prior to the latest
available data due to the fact that our investigation uses four quarter ahead out of sample
forecast of inflation rate and output gap. In our empirical modeling we use the CPI inflation
rate to estimate optimal policy rules as suggested in Svensson (2000).14 Leitemo and So¨derstro¨m
(2005) also argue that imported inflation is considered as one of the components of inflation
while setting the target for inflation. To generate the output gap from the log of GDP for all
the countries, we implement the HP (Hodrick and Prescott (1997)) filter.15
We use the respective short term interest rate of the each country such as the overnight
interbank rate for the UK and the overnight money market rate for Canada, the call-money
rate for Japan as the policy variable.16 For the US, we use the Federal-Funds rate as the
appropriate policy instruments as argued by researchers including Bernanke and Mihov (1998)
and Clarida et al. (1998). Since our model embodies the foreign monetary policy instrument,
the US is taken as the foreign country when we estimate the policy rule for the UK, Canada
and Japan. The UK, on the other hand, is considered as the foreign country when we evaluate
the policy rule for the US. The exchange rate appears in our model within a forward looking
framework as suggested in Svensson (2000).
The data are collected from the international financial statistics (IFS) database published
by the International Monetary Fund(IMF). The 12-month forward exchange rate for the UK is
14The domestic inflation is more relevant when estimating the policy rule for closed economy.
15Alternatively, it is possible to generate a proxy for output gap by linear de-trending approach. For instance,
while Taylor (1993) uses linear de-trending to compute the output gap series, Taylor (1999) employs HP filter
for computation of output gap series.
16Among others Miyao (2002), Miyao (2000), Kasa and Popper (1997), Morgan (1993) use call money rate as
an instrument of monetary policy for the bank of Japan. Miyao (2002) prefers call money rate over monetary
aggregates as an appropriate measure of monetary policy because interest rate is predetermined for monetary
aggregates. De Andrade and Divino (2005) also argue in favor of call rate as a policy instrument.
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accessed from the bank of England data sources whereas for the US, Canada and Japan data
are obtained form the datastream database.
4 Discussion of Results
In what follows, we present for each country several different variants of Equation (10) in Tables
1-4 where we use four quarter ahead forecast horizon to proxy the forward looking variables.
We must note that while our main results are based on four quarter ahead forecast horizon,
for robustness check, we also estimate all models using one quarter ahead forecast horizon as
a proxy for the forward looking variables. Results from this set, which are available from the
authors upon request, provide similar observations.
Table 1 presents results for Canada, Table 2 for Japan, Table 3 for the UK and Table 4
for the US. Each table provides estimates for six different models. The first column depicts
results for the full open economy model (Equation (10)) which assumes that the policy makers
use an asymmetric loss function with respect to both inflation and output gap. In columns 2,
3 and 4, we still allow for the open economy framework, while the model in column 2 relaxes
the assumption of asymmetry for inflation only, that in column 3 relaxes the assumption of
asymmetry only for output gap and that in column 4 relaxes the assumption of asymmetry for
both inflation and output gap. In column 5, we maintain the assumption of asymmetry but we
assume closed economy. Finally, the last column presents results for a simple forward looking
Taylor rule by relaxing both asymmetry and open economy assumptions where policy makers
are assumed to have quadratic loss function.
4.1 General Observations
We have three sets of key results. First, we observe that the monetary policy aims to stabilize
the economic environment by reacting to inflationary pressures driven by both domestic and
foreign factors. That is the central bank not only reacts to movements in expected inflation but
also to movements in real exchange rate and foreign interest rate. Second, we provide empirical
evidence that central banks have asymmetric preferences concerning the positive or negative
deviation of inflation and output gap, respectively. We show that the central bank reacts more
strongly to positive deviations of inflation from its target level than to negative deviations from
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the target. Furthermore, although our findings generally confirm that that the policy makers
dislike negative output gap, there are some instances that the policy makers respond to positive
output gap. We interpreted this observation as that the central bank is mainly concerned about
inflation and considers a positive output gap as an indicator of future inflation. Third, our
findings provide evidence towards the importance of the use of an open economy framework in
discussing monetary policy rules. Our claim is not only due to the significance of foreign policy
variables in Equation (10) but it is also because of sign changes on the asymmetry parameters
beyond our expectations as the open economy assumption is relaxed.
4.2 Bank of Canada
Table 1 provides our results for Canada. In all columns of this table, as expected, we observe
that the impact of expected output gap and expected inflation (captured by ϕ1 and ϕ2) on
the monetary policy rule is positive and significant. In fact, the impact of expected inflation
is greater than unity indicating that an increase in expected inflation leads to a more than
one-for-one increase in the nominal interest rate. This finding implies that the model is stable
and has a unique equilibrium.
We next focus on the impact of the real exchange rate and that of the real foreign interest
rate on the domestic monetary policy. The table shows that the coefficient associated with the
real exchange rate is negative (ϕ3 < 0) and that with the real foreign interest rate is positive
(ϕ4 > 0). These two coefficients play a key role in identifying the type of policy rule pursued
by the central bank (i.e. active or passive). To have the above sign structure, inspecting the
components of ϕ3 and ϕ4, we should have (α2β2+α3β2−β3) > 0, (α3β2) < 0 and (α3β2+β3) > 0.
These requirements suggest that the central bank follows an active monetary policy where
the nominal interest rate must increase more in proportion to the expected inflation which
changes as a consequence of movements in the foreign policy variables. In particular, note
that the first term of (α2β2 + α3β2 − β3) captures the reaction of domestic interest rate to
expected inflation and to output changes. The remaining two terms reflect the impact of real
exchange rate changes on output gap and inflation. The positive sign associated with the third
component above ((α3β2 + β3) > 0), which appears as the numerator of (ϕ4), implies that the
total impact (current and expected) of real exchange rate on inflation is positive. However, to
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obtain (α2β2+α3β2−β3) > 0 we must have (α2β2) > (α3β2−β3). Thus, an expected depreciation
will increase current and expected inflation but it will also increase nominal interest rate above
expected inflation. This is consistent with the coefficient of expected inflation being above one
in all columns (ϕ2 > 1).
When we turn to inspect the coefficients that capture the presence of asymmetric preferences
of the policy makers regarding inflation and output gap, we arrive at the following observations.
The first column of Table 1 shows that the coefficient of inflation volatility (ϕ5) is positive and
significant. This observation provides further support to the view that the bank of Canada
(BOC) is inflation averse. This is so because the significance of inflation volatility implies that
the marginal cost of inflation will increase as inflation deviates from its target level. Thus,
inflation uncertainty will induce a prudent behavior on the part of BOC which sets the interest
rate accounting both for the expected inflation and its uncertainty. In doing so BOC increases
nominal interest rate more than is required by the expected inflation. In column 2, this param-
eter is still significant and positive when we relax the assumption of asymmetry with respect to
the output gap. However, in column 5, the same coefficient becomes negative and significant
when we assume a closed economy framework. The change in sign may be due to the exclusion
of the open economy elements from the subsequent models, suggesting that the closed economy
framework is not desirable.
As we explore the output gap asymmetry coefficient (ϕ6), we see from column 1 that the
coefficient of output gap volatility is negative but insignificant. However, when we turn to
column 3, which relaxes the assumption of inflation asymmetry, the coefficient of output gap
volatility becomes positive and significant at the 10% level. Although positive output gap
asymmetry is not consistent with our expectations and the significance level is rather weak, this
observation provides support for the view that the main focus of BOC is to keep inflation below
target. In this context, one can argue that BOC considers output gap as a predictor of inflation.
Nevertheless, results for the closed economy model presented in column 5, show that the same
coefficient, takes a negative and significant sign at the 1% level. Although this is consistent
with the view that central banks under-predict growth to reduce inflationary pressure, evidence
of negative ϕ5 points to the direction of mispecification error driven by the strong assumption
of Canada being a close economy.
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In column 6, we provide results for the closed economy framework where the model lacks the
asymmetry effects as well as the open economy elements. In that sense this column presents the
standard model where policy makers use quadratic loss function. Here, although the coefficient
estimates appear to be reasonable, compared to the model depicted in column 1, this model
is misspecified in the light of the Wald tests which verifies joint significance of inflation and
output gap volatilities.
4.3 Bank of Japan (BOJ)
We, next, focus on the estimates for the bank of Japan which are presented in Table 2. In
line with those findings reported in the literature, the coefficients of both expected inflation
and expected output gap are positive and significant.17 Similar to BOC, the monetary policy
adopted by BOJ satisfy the Taylor principle as the estimated coefficient of expected inflation
is greater than 1 (ϕ2 > 1). This finding implies that the model is stable and has a unique
equilibrium.
Moving on to explore the impact of the real exchange rate and the real foreign interest rate
on domestic monetary policy, we see that the coefficients associated with these two variables
(ϕ3 and ϕ4, respectively) take the expected signs as they are both positive and significant at
the 1% level in all models. This finding suggests that currency depreciation will lead the central
bank to increase the interest rate as a loss in the value of the currency induces inflationary
pressures on the economy. Likewise, the domestic interest rate follows the movement in the
foreign interest rate.
When we turn to the influence of output gap volatility and inflation volatility on the policy
measure, we find that both measures exert a significant impact. Different from the case of
Canada, we observe that inflation volatility exerts a negative and significant effect on the policy
rule while output volatility has a significant and positive effect. These findings suggest that
an increase in inflation volatility leads to a reduction whereas an increase in output volatility
causes an increase in the interest rate. However, it should be noted that the total impact
of inflation and output gap uncertainty on nominal interest rate is positive (ϕ5 + ϕ6 > 0).
Considering the implication of the estimates on the parameters of the model given in Equations
(1-4), we argue that policy makers at BOJ are more concerned about inflation undershooting
17See for instance Miyao (2000); Miyao (2002) and Clarida et al. (2000).
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its target than overshooting it. In column 2 once we exclude the impact of output gap volatility
the asymmetry parameter of inflation turns positive (ϕ5 > 0). In column 3, we see that the
asymmetry parameter of output gap is still positive. These findings can be explained taking
into account the long deflationary period that Japan went through in the 90s which still affects
her economy.18 In particular, Miyao (2000) argue that the Japanese economy experienced a
stagnation after the bubble economy burst.19 This led to a substantial decline in the short term
interest rates such as the discount rate and call money rate to push the economy back to its
long run track.
Interestingly, we should note that BOJ reacts more when output overshoots its long run
target than when it falls short of it, as captured by the positive sign of the output gap volatility
coefficient. Hence, the interest rate is tightened more in periods of expansion as compared to
easing of the interest rate when output contracts by the same magnitude. We argue that this
observation is an outcome of the fact that Japan experienced a stagnant economy in most of
the period under investigation. Results in column 5 for the closed economy case show that BOJ
under-predict both expected inflation and output growth but at the same time BOJ follows an
active monetary policy by fighting rather than accommodating inflation. This is consistent with
the inflation averse policy followed by the BOJ prior to the financial crisis in the early 90s and
after the long-lasting stagnation following the burst of the real estate bubble.20
It is also worth noting that we conduct the Wald test and verify that inflation and output
gap volatility coefficients are significantly different from zero. This observation suggests that
the Bank of Japan has asymmetric preferences towards movements in inflation and output.
4.4 Bank of England (BOE)
Table 3 presents our results for the UK. In columns 1-6, we see that the impact of expected
output gap and expected inflation is positive. In particular, the impact of expected inflation on
interest rate is positive (ϕ2 > 1) and stronger than that of the expected output gap suggesting
18Bec et al. (2002) found similar results for France where the deflationary pressures were weighted more than
the inflationary pressures.
19Japan experienced a bubble economy following the strong economic boom in the late 80s as the asset prices
increased substantially.
20BOJ followed an expansionary monetary policy in the late 80s to mitigate the effects of Yen’s appreciation.
The expansionary monetary policy accompanied with current account surplus led to excess liquidity in the
financial system fueling asset prices. To counteract inflationary pressure the BOJ doubled the bank rate. The
increase in the bank rate led to the burst of assets prices and increase the number of loan defaults. The by-product
of loan defaults was a long-lasting stagnation.
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that the model is stable and has a unique equilibrium.
As we inspect the effects of the exchange rate and the foreign interest rate, we see that the
results are similar to that of Japan. The expected real exchange rate has a positive and sizable
impact on the UK interest rate (ϕ3 > 0) reflecting the response of monetary policy to changes
in real exchange rate. In addition, the real foreign interest rate has a positive (ϕ4 > 0) and
significant impact on domestic interest rate.21 Yet, the size of this coefficient is smaller than
that associated with the real exchange rate. In that context, the results presented in column 5
provide further support to the view that the BOE accounts for changes in the monetary policy
of the US.
We next observe that the impact of inflation and output gap volatility on domestic interest
rate is positive and negative, respectively. Accounting for the effects of uncertainty concerning
the state variables, it appears that the BOE tend to adopt a precautionary policy regarding
the behavior of inflation as the signs associated with ϕ2 and ϕ5 are both positive and greater
than one. While at the same time BOE, as depicted by the coefficients ϕ1 and ϕ6 under-
predict output gap and respond less than one-for-one to output gap changes. In this context,
our findings suggest that the BOE will increase the interest rate above the conditional mean
of inflation but the under-prediction of output-growth will lead to low interest rate which is
preferred in periods of recession. In doing so, we argue that the BOE aims to strengthen its
anti-inflationary credibility. Thus, although the BOE is inflation averse, it responds to real
economic activity independently of its concerns about inflation. The Wald test statistics show
that inflation and output gap volatility coefficients are significantly different from zero providing
further evidence that the Bank of England has asymmetric preferences.
Results in column 2-6 are consistent with those presented in column 1. Exception to this
is column 3 where the sign of output gap asymmetry is positive at the 10% significance level.
Although this observation might be due to the restrictions imposed on the model, it is possible
that the positive sign is reflecting that the BOE use output gap as an indicator to forecast
inflation. In column 5, where we entertain a closed economy model with asymmetric loss
function, both inflation and output gap volatility attain significant coefficients with correct
signs.
21Similar findings are documented by Clarida et al. (1998) regarding the effect of German interest rate on the
UK monetary policy when Germany was used as the foreign country. Clarida et al. (1998) show that one percent
increase of German interest rate induce 60 basis points rise in the British interest rate.
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4.5 The Federal Reserve (FED)
Last we focus on results for the US which we report in Table 4. Overall, signs of the associated
variables estimated for the US are similar to that of Canada. We find that expected output
gap (ϕ1) and expected inflation (ϕ2) have a positive impact on the domestic interest rate.
However, in several models, the coefficient associated with the expected inflation is low, in the
vicinity of unity or smaller, except for the last model where we assume closed economy with
quadratic loss function. Although the coefficient estimates of the expected inflation that we
report in columns 1-6 could raise questions about the stability of the model, arguments carried
out in Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) as well as in Bullard and Mitra (2002), and Lubik and
Marzo (2007) point out that equilibrium is a system property which depends on the linkages
between the parameters of the Taylor rule and of the structural parameters.22 Thus, a low
inflation coefficient should be interpreted with caution and should not be taken as evidence for
indeterminacy. More concretely, in column 1 the coefficient of expected inflation is marginally
above one but the total response of interest rate to inflationary pressure is well above one
(ϕ2 + ϕ5 > 1); there is no evidence of indeterminacy in the full model. However, in columns
2-4 where we gradually remove the assumption of asymmetry, the coefficient associated with
inflation variability is estimated to be insignificant while the coefficient of expected inflation is
below one. In this case, one can suggest that there is evidence of indeterminancy which might
be an outcome of specification error.
When we inspect the coefficients associated with the exchange rate and the foreign real
interest rate (ϕ3 and ϕ4, respectively), we see that these coefficients follow the pattern that
we observed for Canada (column 1).23 The coefficient associated with the real exchange rate
is negative (ϕ3 < 0) and that with the real foreign interest rate is positive (ϕ4 > 0). Similar
to the case of Canada, these findings suggest that the FED follows an active monetary policy
where the nominal interest rate increases more than in proportion to an increase in the expected
inflation which changes as a consequence of movements in the foreign policy variables. Thus,
an expected depreciation will increase current and expected inflation but it will also increase
22Clarida et al. (2000) show that if the policy rule includes only current level of inflation (i.e. it = ϕ0 +ϕ2Etpit)
then determinancy requires ϕ2 > 1. Alternatively, Bullard and Mitra (2002) and Lubik and Marzo (2007) show
that if the policy rules includes forward looking values of inflation and output gap (i.e. it = ϕ0 + ϕ1Etyt+1 +
ϕ2Etpit+1) then determinancy is achieved if 0 ≤ ϕ1 < 1α2 , and max{1 −
1−β
β2
ϕ1, 0} < ϕ2 < 1 + 2 1+ββ2α2 −
1+β
β2
holds.
23Recall that we take the UK as the foreign country for the case of US.
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nominal interest rate above expected inflation.
Next, we inspect the coefficients that capture the presence of asymmetric preferences of
the policy makers regarding inflation and output gap. We find that both measures exert a
significant impact on the policy rule pursued by the FED. We observe that inflation volatility
has a positive impact on the domestic interest rate suggesting that the FED increases the interest
rate to achieve a stable economic environment. Moreover, as in the earlier cases, the positive
and statistically significant association between the volatility of inflation rate and the domestic
interest rate suggests that the response of the FED is asymmetric with respect to changes in
the inflation rate. In other words, the FED puts more weight to the upward swings of inflation
from the target than the downward swings. This finding is consistent with earlier research such
as Dolado et al. (2004) and Bec et al. (2002) among others who provide an evidence in favor of
asymmetric preference of central bank with respect to inflation rate for the post 1979 period.
These authors argue that a nonlinear policy rule for the post 1983 period reasonably portrays
the US policy preferences.24
We also find that the volatility of output gap is negative and statistically significant at the
1% level. This indicates that the FED is more responsive to output contractions rather than to
expansions similar to the case of UK and Canada. In other words, output contractions induce
relatively more loosening of the interest rate than an increase in interest rate induced by output
expansions of the same size. This finding is in line with Surico (2007) who argues that an output
contraction is more important than an expansion in implementation of asymmetric monetary
policy rules for the US.
In column 6, we provide results for the closed economy framework where policy makers
use quadratic loss function. The model lacks asymmetry effects as well as the open economy
elements. Although the closed economy model results are reasonable in terms of the sign and
size of the coefficient estimates (the coefficient of expected inflation is positive and greater than
1), the model is too naive as the Wald tests reject the null that the coefficients of asymmetric
preferences and of foreign variables are not significantly different from zero.
24However, we must also note that Surico (2007) and Surico (2003) document a statistically insignificant
response of federal funds rate towards squared inflation and conclude that the preferences of central bank towards
inflation are not asymmetric.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper we construct an analytical model to investigate the optimal policy rule of a cen-
tral bank with an asymmetric loss function subject to an open economy forward looking New
Keynesian macroeconomic framework. We then estimate the policy rule that we obtain from
the above framework along with a number models which we formulate imposing restrictions on
the original model. The empirical investigation is carried out on quarterly data for four indus-
trialized countries—Canada, Japan, the UK and the US. The data cover the period between
1979q1-2010q1.
Our empirical results can be summarized in three main categories. First, we provide evidence
that the central banks in our study follow an active monetary policy as they account for the
impact of foreign policy variable. More concretely, central banks carefully consider the impact
that real exchange rate have on output and inflation while setting the interest rate. Our
investigation also provides evidence that central banks increase the nominal interest rate more
than one-for-one to a change in expected inflation. Overall, estimated coefficients provide
support that the models we estimate are stable except for some cases when we discuss the
behavior of the FED where the estimated expected inflation coefficient is less than one. Although
this could be a result of the omitted variables in that specific case, some researchers (including
Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), Bullard and Mitra (2002) and Lubik and Marzo (2007)) point
out that equilibrium is a system property which depends on the interrelations between the
parameters of the Taylor rule and those of the structural model.
Second, we find evidence suggesting that all central banks whose policy choices we investigate
in this paper have asymmetric preferences for their target variables. In particular, we find that
the inflation volatility coefficient is positive suggesting that central banks change the nominal
interest rate more when inflation exceeds the target level rather than when it falls below. When
we look at the presence of asymmetry associated with the output gap we are confronted with
differing reactions. Although we expect to see that a central bank should be more concerned
when output gap falls below the target, for some cases we find that the central bank can be more
reactionary during periods of positive output gap. We address this observation arguing that
the central banks may be inflation averse and may take a positive output gap as an indicator
of future inflation. Third, in line with the first finding, foreign variables have a significant
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impact on domestic monetary policy. This view is based not only on the significant effect of the
real exchange rate and foreign real interest rate on domestic monetary policy but also on the
closed economy models. We find that once we relax the open economy assumption, the sign of
asymmetry parameters change providing evidence of specification error which might be driven
by an omitted variable problem.
Overall, the findings we present here help us better understand the behavior of policy makers
who have an asymmetric response towards inflation and/or output gap under an open econ-
omy framework. Yet, for future research, we believe that it would be fruitful to model and
empirically investigate the interest rate smoothing hypothesis by implementing a framework
as in this paper. We also think that expanding the set of countries under investigation can
broaden our understanding. Finally, in line with the recommendation of Lubik and Schorfheide
(2007) one can pursue a multivariate approach by estimating the entire structural model using
system GMM. Although, Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) argue that full-information maximum
likelihood exploit cross-equation restrictions, Ruge-Murcia (2007) show that limited information
procedures are more robust to model mispecification. Ruge-Murcia (2007) show that GMM and
simulated method of moment deliver more precise estimates than maximum likelihood. Thus,
it would be useful to extend the current study employing system GMM approach to account
for the recommendations of both Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) and Ruge-Murcia (2007).
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Figure 2: Recursive Forecasts
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